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A Combinatorial-Probabilistic Analysis of Bitcoin Attacks
Evangelos GEORGIADIS and Doron ZEILBERGER
Abstract: In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto* famously invented bitcoin, and in his (or her, or their, or
its) white paper sketched an approximate formula for the probability of a successful double spending
attack by a dishonest party. This was corrected by Meni Rosenfeld, who, under more realistic as-
sumptions, gave the exact probability (missing a foundational proof); and another formula (along
with foundational proof), in terms of the Incomplete Beta function, was given later by Cyril Grun-
span and Ricardo Pe´rez-Marco, that enabled them to derive an asymptotic formula for that quantity.
Using Wilf-Zeilberger algorithmic proof theory, we continue in this vein and present a recurrence
equation for the above-mentioned probability of success, that enables a very fast compilation of these
probabilities. We next use this recurrence to derive (in algorithmic fashion) higher-order asymptotic
formulas, extending the formula of Grunspan and Pe´rez-Marco who only did the leading term. We
then study the statistical properties (expectation, variance, etc.) of the duration of a successful
attack.
Important: This article is accompanied by a Maple package, Bitcoin.txt, available from the
front of this article
http://sites.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/mamarim/mamarimhtml/bitcoin.html ,
where readers can also find numerous input and output files.
In due course, the current package will also be available along with an implementation in Math-
Cognify’s own symbolic languageB from
https://github.com/MathCognifyTechnologies/fr-crypto-bitcoin-1.
A Two-Phase Soccer Match
In order to make this article self-contained and focus on the core combinatorial structure that
underpins much of the process of the double spend attack, we will postpone the malevolent lan-
guage of cyber-attacks until the penultimate section of this article, i.e., the notes and remarks
section. There we provide context and references to the double-spending attack for the interested
reader; additionally, we pinpoint weaknesses and inconsistencies in Dr. Satoshi Nakamoto’s paper
– strengthening our belief that he is (or was) a competent scientist but not a combinatorialist. For
now, we provide an equivalent model featuring a two-phase Soccer match, where one of the two
teams is worse than the other.
* From here onwards, we refer to Satoshi Nakamoto as Dr. Satoshi Nakamoto or Dr. Nakamoto.
B Donations in BTC are appreciated, if you’d like to support this type of research; some parts of the
work will see the light of Free Software. The BTC address is: 3B69VRGSGt41K5GBrvCWaiUZ6uE2md9i9q.
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There are two Soccer teams called the Good Androids∞ Team (henceforth G) and the Bad
Androids Team (henceforth B). Luckily team G is better than team B. Whenever they play the
probability of team B scoring the next goal is q, with q < 1
2
, and hence the probability of team G
scoring the next goal is 1− q. The scoring of any given goal is independent of any past or future
goals.
There is a positive integer n, decided beforehand. So the game has two parameters, the continuous
yet once chosen, fixed, q, with 0 < q < 1
2
, and the discrete n. A forthcoming paper [E1], provides
a more involved, protocol specific, analysis, with a focus towards the stochastic version of q.
The match has two phases.
Phase I: Play until team G scores n goals. By then team B scored m goals, say, and team G is
n−m goals ahead.
Phase II: In the unlikely event that m ≥ n, i.e., that team B scored at least as many goals as team
G, team B is declared a winner immediately. Otherwise they keep playing until either team B
caught up and tied the score, and is declared the winner, or else team B is so much behind, say, by
a zillion (not necessarily googol) goals, to make it hopeless for it to ever catch up, in which case it
is declared the loser.
Questions:
1. What is the probability, in terms of q and n, of team B winning?
2. Assuming that team B won, what can you say about the random variable duration of Phase II?
In particular its expectation and variance?
In a beautiful, very lucid, article, Meni Rosenfeld ([R]), correcting an approximate formula in [N],
answered Question 1 by stating and proving the following theorem.
Theorem 0 (Meni Rosenfeld, [R], p. 7, Eq. (1)): The probability of team B winning, henceforth
to be called the Rosenfeld Polynomial∗∗, Rn(q), is given in terms of the following expression,
∞ Androids are humanoid robots. Our incentive for picking androids, is at least two-fold. For one,
our creations are emotionless – thereby strengthening some of our key assumptions below by taking
the almost unpredictable nature or volatility of human emotions out of the parameter space. For
another, networked androids enable easier generalizations.
∗∗ In honor of Meni Rosenfeld’s pioneering spirit for correctly guessing that the negative binomial
distribution provides a better approximation. Note, the duo, Cyril Grunspan and Ricardo Pe´rez-
Marco, are the first to cement this guess via proof in [GP,Proposition 5.3 on p. 10]; namely, that
the negative binomial distribution is the exact distribution in the bitcoin model, under a given set
of simplifying assumptions.
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featuring binomial coefficients sums:
Rn(q) = 1 − (1− q)n
n−1∑
m=0
(
n+m− 1
m
)
qm + qn
n−1∑
m=0
(
n+m− 1
m
)
(1− q)m .
For the sake of completeness, let us engineer a proof for our model, phrased in terms of Soccer.
Proof of Theorem 0: Let m (m ≥ 0), be the number of goals scored by team B at the end
of Phase I. The probability that it was indeed m is given in terms of the negative binomial
distribution, and equals (
n+m− 1
m
)
(1− q)n qm .
Indeed, the score right before (necessarily by team G) last goal was n − 1 goals for team G and
m goals for team B. There are
(
n+m−1
m
)
possible ‘histories’ of getting there, since out of the total
n +m− 1 goals scored, one has to choose m of them to go to Team B (and the remaining n − 1
goals go to Team G). By independence, the probability of each such history is (1 − q)n qm. The
probability that Team B won immediately at the end of Phase I is thus
∞∑
m=n
(
n+m− 1
m
)
(1−q)n qm = 1−
n−1∑
m=0
(
n+m− 1
m
)
(1−q)n qm = 1− (1−q)n
n−1∑
m=0
(
n+m− 1
m
)
qm .
On the other hand if m < n, Team B still has a chance to catch up. Right now it is n − m
goals behind. By the classical gambler’s ruin problem (e.g., [F] for a mathematically mature
exposition or [p. 63, TB] as primer with worked out solution to problem 42, see also [Z1] for an
algorithmic exegesis), the probability of catching up (i.e., tying the score) is ( q1−q )
n−m. Hence if
team B managed to score m goals in Phase I, with m < n, the probability of its succeeding to
eventually catch up is:
(
q
1− q )
n−m
(
n+m− 1
m
)
(1− q)n qm =
(
n+m− 1
m
)
(1− q)m qn .
Adding from m = 0 to m = n− 1 and combining with the probability of immediate success, done
above, completes the proof Theorem 0.
How would you compute the first, say, 10000 Rosenfeld polynomials? An efficient way would be via
a linear recurrence equation, alias difference equation. Using the Zeilberger algorithm [Z2], that
is part of Wilf-Zeilberger algorithmic proof theory [PWZ], one gets the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The Rosenfeld polynomials Rn(q) that compute the probability of team B winning
if its probability of scoring a single goal is q and team G scored n goals in Phase I, satisfies the
following second-order linear recurrence with polynomial coefficients
Rn (q) = −
(
4nq2 − 4 qn− 6 q2 − n+ 6 q + 1
)
Rn−1 (q)
n− 1 + 2
q (q − 1) (2n − 3)Rn−2 (q)
n− 1 ,
with initial conditions R0(q) = 1, R1(q) = 2 q.
By finding an alternative expression for Rn(q), in terms of the Incomplete Beta function
@, Cyril
@ For completeness, we provide their formula in [GP, Theorem 6.1 p. 13], P (z) = Is(z, 1/2).
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Grunspan and Ricardo Pe´rez-Marco [GP] proved that Rn(q) is asymptotically
1√
pi (1− 2q)
(4q(1− q))n√
n
.
Using the methods of [Z3] (and the Maple package AsyRec.txt available from there), we get a much
more precise asymptotics, with error term O( 1
n
11
2
) (and could easily go to much higher orders).
This is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Rn(q) is asymptotically
(4 q(1 − q))n√
pi (1− 2q) ·
1√
n
·
(1 +
12 q2 − 12 q − 1
8 (2 q − 1)2 ·
1
n
+
1
128
400 q4 − 800 q3 + 120 q2 + 280 q + 1
(2 q − 1)4 ·
1
n2
+
5
1024
1344 q6 − 4032 q5 + 112 q4 + 6496 q3 − 3444 q2 − 476 q + 1
(2 q − 1)6 ·
1
n3
+
21
32768
20224 q8 − 80896 q7 − 88832 q6 + 549632 q5 − 514400 q4 + 18368 q3 + 92368 q2 + 3536 q − 1
(2 q − 1)8 ·
1
n4
)
+O(
1
n11/2
) .
If team B won, how long should it take? The following theorem gives an analog of Theorem 0 for
the expected duration of Phase II.
Theorem 3: Let An(q) be the following binomial coefficients sum
An(q) =
qn
1− 2q
n−1∑
m=0
(
n+m− 1
m
)
(1− q)m (n−m) ,
then the expected duration of Phase II, in case team B won, let’s call it En(q), is given by
En(q) =
An(q)
Rn(q)
.
Proof: According to a classical result on the Gambler’s Ruin ([F]), if a random walker starts out L
units to the right of 0, and goes left one unit with probability q and right one unit with probability
1−q, and q < 1
2
then if it makes it to 0, then the expected time is L
1−2q
. (Recall that the probability
that it happens is ( q1−q )
L). Since if m > n the duration of Phase II is 0, the numerator of the
conditional expectation of the duration is An(q), obtained by inserting
n−m
1−2q into the second sum
in Theorem 0. Since everything is conditioned on team B winning, we have to divide by Rn(q).
Like for Rn(q), the Zeilberger algorithm can be used to find a second-order recurrence satisfied by
An(q). Since we already know how to compute Rn(q) fast, this enables the fast compilation of a
table for En(q). This is accomplished by the next theorem.
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Theorem 4: An(q) satisfies the following second-order recurrence
An (q) = −
(
4nq2 − 4 qn− 6 q2 − n+ 6 q
)
An−1 (q)
n− 1 + 2
q (q − 1) (2n− 3)An−2 (q)
n− 2 ,
subject to the initial conditions
A1 (q) =
q
1− 2 q , A2 (q) = 2
q2 (2− q)
1− 2 q .
Using AsyRec.txt ([Z3]) once again, our computer derived an asymptotic formula for An(q) that
we do not state. Combined with the asymptotic formula for Rn(q) given in Theorem 2, it yields
the following theorem that gives an asymptotic formula for the expected duration if team B wins
(i.e., in case of a successful attack), let’s call it En(q).
Theorem 5: The (conditional) expected duration of Phase II (in case team B won), where team
G scores n goals in Phase I, En(q), tends to
1−q
(1−2q)2 as n → ∞. More precisely, the asymptotic
expansion to order 4 is:
(1− q)
(1− 2 q)2 ·
(1− 1
(1− 2 q)2 ·
1
n
− 6 q
2 − 6 q − 1
(1− 2 q)4 ·
1
n2
− 36 q
4 − 72 q3 + 12 q2 + 24 q + 1
(1− 2 q)6 ·
1
n3
−216 q
6 − 648 q5 + 276 q4 + 528 q3 − 306 q2 − 66 q − 1
(1− 2 q)8 ·
1
n4
) +O(
1
n5
) .
Using the same line of reasonings, one can derive a binomial coefficients sum for any given moment,
and from it derive asymptotic formulas. Doing this for the second moment, and combining with
the asymptotic expression for the expectation (Theorem 5), produced the following theorem.
Theorem 6: The variance of the (conditional) duration of Phase II (if team B won) tends to
(1− q)(2 − 3q − 4q2)
(1− 2q)4 ,
as n goes to infinity. More precisely, its asymptotic expansion to order 4 is
(q − 1)(4 q2 − 3 q − 2)
(2 q − 1)4 −
(q − 1)(4 q2 + 2 q − 7)
(2 q − 1)6 ·
1
n
− (q − 1)(24 q
4 − 12 q3 − 58 q2 + 29 q + 18)
(2 q − 1)8 ·
1
n2
− (q − 1)(144 q
6 − 216 q5 − 348 q4 + 444 q3 + 328 q2 − 312 q − 41)
(2 q − 1)10 ·
1
n3
− (q − 1)(864 q
8 − 2160 q7 − 1704 q6 + 4956 q5 + 4632 q4 − 9972 q3 + 1586 q2 + 1711 q + 88)
(2 q − 1)12 ·
1
n4
+O(
1
n5
) .
Note that the standard deviation is larger than the expectation, hence, like the duration in the
Gambler’s Ruin problem, there is no concentration about the mean.
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Notes and remarks:
Dr. Nakamoto’s inconsistency
For a survey of different types of attacks, see [CKLR]. We are interested in the double-spending
attack as proposed by Dr. Satoshi Nakamoto in [N]. Interestingly, or for that matter, amus-
ingly, Dr. Nakamoto’s computational results are not consistent with his explicit description.
Dr. Nakamoto states on page 7 in his white paper [N]:
The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block
and z blocks have been linked after it.
However, in his computation, if z = 0, (i.e., the transaction in question is in a block, however,
there are no subsequent blocks; also known as, 1 confirmation) then, the probability of successfully
double-spending is (miraculously !) 100% (assuming that the attacker has a hashing power of a
meager q = 0.1 (fixed), that is, 10%); refer to page 8 in [N].
The (pragmatic) validity of this statement seems to be a few standard deviations away from the
mean, assuming a Gaussian distribution. In other words, this is far from the truth: when attempting
to double spend a transaction with 1 confirmation, the attacker is surely not guaranteed success.
This inconsistency could arise from either our lack of truly understanding all implicit assumptions
that Dr. Nakamoto made, or it could be a result from an honest slip-up in formulating the explicit
assumptions.1
Two (missing) implicit assumptions
For what it’s worth, our two satoshis, regarding implicit assumptions. There are at least two
implicit assumptions that need to be made: Not only does the attacker have to pre-mine a block
(similar to the Finney attack as outlined by Hal Finney in the original post [HF]), but he is assumed
to win propagation races.
We note that this inconsistency isn’t addressed by [GP] who exhibit mastery of conventional prob-
abilistic machinery to attain their results.3 Rosenfeld in [R], diplomatically circumvents this issue
by explicitly outlining his assumptions.
1 Other slip-ups of different nature, did occur in the paper; e.g., the omission of Feller’s volume
number in the reference section on page 9 in [N]. Any serious student of probability is aware that
Feller published two volumes. Incidentally, the publication year that he provides, maybe indicative
of his age or it’s just noise. That said, in today’s era, the printing year provided, for supposedly
volume 1, is, harder to obtain.
3 Care needs to be taken when using technical jargon. In [GP] the term block validation should be
replaced by finding a solution to the proof-of-work or an analogous phrase, since the process
of validating blocks is more or less instantaneous.
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At last, despite the inherent theoretical limitations of consensus in distributed computing as illus-
trated in [FLP], bitcoin’s ‘consensus’ computes at a market capitalization of >100 billion USD.4
Conclusion: Using Wilf-Zeilberger algorithmic proof theory we investigated the probability, and
duration, of successful bitcoin attacks. Readers can extend the above results to higher moments
using (for the time being) the Maple package Bitcoin.txt, that also contains simulation programs
that confirm all the theoretical formulas.
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